William the Bastard at War

John Gillingham's article William the Bastard at War is nearly twenty years old but it is still one of the most important insights into the Norman invasion of 1066. Most of the article can be read here thanks to Google books or here for the full thing (thanks Lafayette). I do Gillingham a discredit by summerising his excellent article but in essence the argument is a follows:

1.Medieval battles were rare,
2.They were rare because, though potentially decisive, they were equally potentially disastrous,
3.Warfare in the 11th century therefore involved the avoidance of battle. Instead armies would ravage the countryside to such an extent that it forced a showdown. They would use small bands of men to devastate a large area of the country, foraging for their own needs as they went,
4.If faced with an invading army. You had a limited number of choices. If you didn't have an army of your own to hand then you would need to negotiate. However, if you did have an army you could advance to within striking distance of the invaders. Then, since both armies wished to avoid battle, a stalemate would arise. The attackers couldn't forage for fear of being ambushed when weakened, whilst the defenders couldn't challenge since they wish to avoid a major battle. In the end one side would give up and go home.

It appears that William was a master of this tactic in both the attack and defence. This brings us to the events of 1066. William landed in England, set up a strong fortified base and proceeded to pillage the surrounding countryside. So far so good. Harold reacted by moving his army into striking distance and this is were it all goes a bit pear shaped. According to the tactics of the day, this should have lead to a stand off with both armies avoiding battle. However, I believe there were a couple of factors that made this approach unlikely. Firstly, William was unable to retreat due to Harold's fleet in the English channel. Secondly, I believe Harold was using different tactics. He was aware of how William fought, having had first hand experience whilst on campaign with William. He knew William would try and force the issue, he also knew William would not expect a battle. Yet, only weeks before Harold had fought a pitched battle at Stamford Bridge and won. I suspect that in opposition to contemporary thinking Harold set out to engage William in battle. On the morning of the battle of Hastings, Harold forced William's hand engineering the situation to one which a risky pitch battle was unavoidable. I believe this went against William's plan. The battle of was gamble – Harold lost.

You can read more posts about the Battle of Hastings here.

Comments

[Lafayette C. Curtis]

There's also a theory that William decided to give battle because he was running short on supplies and he had to use the huge army he had put together with so much effort before it began to disintegrate because of hunger and lack of pay. Unfortunately, I don't remember where I first heard this theory--but at least I can refer you to another place that provides a free copy of Gillingham's article on good old William as well as two others, one on Richard I (Lionheart) and the other on William Marshall: http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/gillingham.htm

[Gary Smailes]

I too have heard this theory but think that it can be rejected. Medieval campaigning in the mid 11th century was very distinct to it's time. William's army would not have had used a supply system that is familiar to later mediaeval armies. When on campaign William's men would have been expected to survive wholly on foraging. In the English invasion (and other actions in Northern France) William's first action was to set up a fortified stronghold. He then sent his men out to ravage the surrounding country side. This had two aims. Firstly to cause havoc and force Harold's hand, but the second was to find supplies. On using this tactic William knew Harold had no choice to manoeuvre his army to a position that would stop William from foraging. William's past experience suggests that Harold may well have been open to negotiation at this point. However, my argument is that Harold had every intention of engaging William from the moment he moved his army south. I suspect that Harold knew that a pitch battle was risky but was prepared to take the gamble to rid himself of William once and for all.

Thanks for the link to article - I have updated my post.

Gary

[Titus]

Re: Gillingham's article on Richard I, the article is titled "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," and it is just as good, if not better, than "William the Bastard at War." A key point that Gillingham elludes to, which doesn't get much attention from medievalists, is the central role intelligence had in the medieval way of war.

[Titus]

Re: Gillingham's article on Richard I, the article is titled "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," and it is just as good, if not better, than "William the Bastard at War." A key point that Gillingham elludes to, which doesn't get much attention from medievalists, is the central role intelligence had in the medieval way of war.

[Gary Smailes]

Thanks for the pointer to the article.

Intelligence was a vital part to all medieval warfare. It is believed that both William and Harold were fully aware of both the composition and movement of each others army. Much is made in the contemporary accounts of the Battle of Hastings of the manner in which William either listened to or ignored intelligence reports. Little is known of just how aware Harold was of Williams plans.

[Titus]

If you accept that medieval warfare consisted of primarily of quick ambushes and equally quick retreats, then it's hard to imagine a warfare style more dependent on intelligence.

BTW, doesn't the Bayeux Tapestry depict a scene in which a scout reports to William the position of Harold's army?